Introduction
There are two distinct phases to Mexico's modern trade strategy, each representing a different approach to multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations.
The first phase, covering from 1970 to 1985, is characterized by two failed attempts at opening the trade regime unilaterally, including an unsuccessful effort to join the GATT at the end the Tokyo Round in 1979 due to domestic political pressures. During this phase the country's economic strategy was inward oriented, and regionalism was not high in the priorities of Mexican policymakers.
The second phase, from 1986 to date, combines unilateral trade liberalization, accession to the GATT, and the signing of thirteen FTAs with countries in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. It includes Mexico's formal entrance as a full member of APEC and the OECD. It is when competitive regionalism became a central component of a new outwardoriented strategy.
The transition from one phase to the next is usually explained in terms of the collapse of the strategy of industrialization through import-substitution (ISI) in 1982, 1 but can also be seen as part of a broader trend of greater formalization of Mexico's increasing economic relations with the world. This trend began to 1 A large body of literature has already done this. See for example take shape in the early 1970s, when trade represented about 20% of Mexican GDP, and consolidated by the late 1990s, as this proportion reached close to 60%.
Throughout this period Mexico signed a larger number, and geographically disperse, set of economic agreements than before, ranging from bilateral investment protection, double taxation, financial and customs cooperation, and promotion, limited preferential trade concessions, and fullfledged free trade.
The extent to which the formalization of international economic exchanges through legal documents was a result or a cause of a greater level of international economic intercourse is subject to debate, but there is little doubt that the arrival of regionalism in Mexico is part, if not the expression, of this internationalization trend. Greater trade and investment flows required a greater degree of policy coordination, or at least, collaboration, with the country's main trade and investment partners, most notably the United States (US). As the requirements for coordination increased, the scope of the agreements also increased, until limited engagement gave way to greater integration under the terms of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
From this broad review one might rightly conclude that functionalism explains much of the action behind Mexican international economic policy choices, but it is only a beginning. The story behind Mexico's choice of trading partners does not correlate perfectly with the intensity of economic exchange.
While a broad correspondence between these two factors does exist, deviations are also apparent, associated with non-economic factors.
To understand these choices it is necessary to go beyond purely economic, or functional, explanations for regionalism. The drive to emulate countries in North America and Europe who were implementing successful integration policies, as well as countries in Asia which achieved high economic growth rates through export promotion, supported the Mexican government's decisions in its effort to sell Mexico as a good destination for foreign investors, among other objectives. The private sector's concerns over its competitiveness, in light of integration initiatives north of the Mexican border, derived into active lobbying, and thus influenced policy shifts in the direction of free trade.
Accounting for Mexico's sequential choice of trade partners, and of eventual success in reaching a FTAs, requires paying attention to the international economic, political and legal environment in which it has been immersed, with an eye to the challenges that have guided its foreign policy toward its neighbors. It requires as well paying attention to developments in the domestic arena, for Mexico adopted the strategy of competitive regionalism to advance its own domestic reform agenda, not exclusively to accomplish foreign policy objectives. 
A review of Mexico's trade negotiations, 1970-2005

Mexico's Competitive Regional Strategy Begins
The The frequent amending of Mexican laws and regulations affecting trade and investment causes a serious lack of confidence among private investors. In Mexico, the legal order and the institutions that support it should be strengthened and given permanence and stability. Of paramount importance are (1) Salinas had another important reason to wait: during 1989 the most pressing priority for his government was to renegotiate the terms of its foreign 10 A country that does not respect its international commitments faces the risk losing potential partners. This represents a reputation cost. To avoid this outcome, the traditional practice is to make international agreements the law of the land. This represents another cost, for the justification for reneging on an international agreement is that germane constitutional provisions have changed.
11 He had advanced this argument during his presidential campaign in 1988, and was the position with which he took office (Flores Quiroga, 1998 (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) , then as the most prominent Cabinet members with Salinas (1988 Salinas ( -1994 (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . They replaced the cadre of policymakers that had recommended against Mexico's entrance to the GATT and the adoption of export-led strategy in the late 1970s. 18 They also constituted an epistemic community on their own, friendly to open markets, with connections to the international financial community, able to push forward a new framework for economic policy. As observers of the integration experiences of North America and Europe, in particular the positive fate of Spain, and the export-oriented success of the Asian Tigers, they sought to modernize Mexico by emulating their experiences.
Their initial efforts in the 1980s concentrated on eliminating the antiexport bias of Mexican trade policy, while securing better terms of access of the country's exports to the US market. As their power consolidated in the 1990s, but especially as their economic program gained roots, they pushed for a more comprehensive approach: negotiate better terms of access with the US, yes, but 18 The Economic Cabinet of then president José López- Portillo (1976 Portillo ( -1982 was dominated by economists closer to the tradition of ECLA and Cambridge, institutions which at the time advocated more state involvement in the economy. For an exploration into the determinants of López-Portillo's decision to postpone Mexico's GATT accession see Story (1983) and FlroesQuiroga (1998) . (1989a, 1989b) . 20 See below for determinants of this decision. Detailed acocunts of the process through which it was reached can be found in De la Madrid (1985) , Flores Quiroga (1998), SECOFI (1988 ), Ten Kate (1992 . 21 Mexico signed with the IMF a Letter of Intent in April 1985 in which it committed to: (1)liberalize between 35% and 45% of imports before the end of 1985 -including reducing tariff levels from 10 to 7 and setting most tariffs between 10% and 50%; (2)grant automatic import permits of raw materials and machinery parts when the price of domestic substitutes exceed 50%; and (3)allow exporters to import up to 40% of the value of their export revenues without the requirement of any permit, while letting them to import free of duties any good used as input.
begun to impose countervailing duties (CVDs) on imports coming from countries that subsidized their exports, such as Mexico. 22 The controversy surrounding these CVDs is particularly relevant for our story, as its outcome opened the door to the adherence of Mexico to the GATT, and eventually, to the pursuit of FTAs. Mexican producers could have disputed the imposition of CVDs, in principle, by resorting to the "injury test," which allowed exporters to show that they were not engaged in unfair trade. Weintraub (1990) provides a discussion of this shift in US policy. The US was also objecting Mexico's industrial promotion programs, especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Flores Quiroga, 1998) . 23 The Subsidies Agreement, already incorporated into US trade legislation, established that direct export subsides constituted unfair trade, thus liable to face CVDs. An exporter from country that was a GATT contracting party could resort to the "injury test" to show that it was not relying on those subsides to gain an unfair competitive advantage, in which case the CVD would be eliminated. But an exporter from a country suspect of using subsides that was not a GATT contracting-party did not count with that line of defense. 24 The targets included credit, export, energy, and other production subsidies central to the government's industrial promotion policy. Lyman (1989) interprets this episode as an example of a conscious and successful US foreign policy directed at pushing for a transformation in Mexico's trade regime.
import tariff is equivalent to an export tax), which decreased the costs of imported inputs.
Adhesion to the GATT, as many inside and outside the government realized, was all but inevitable at that point: in agreeing to remove export subsidies and unilaterally lowering tariffs, Mexico was already operating under the GATT regime, but without enjoying its benefits in the form of greater access to foreign markets. 25 While the case could be made that unilateral liberalization was welfare-enhancing, it was even better to join the GATT and obtain reciprocal tariff concessions from the country's main export partners.
Mexico's move to join the GATT was soon interpreted as a sign that it was taking measures to avoid the reversal of trade reforms. 26 In the 1970s the (1986, 1988) discusses the terms of the debate and the technical issue behind accession to the GATT at that time. 26 Ten Kate (1992a Kate ( , 1992b 
Choosing additional trade partners
Negotiations for NAFTA, which began in 1990, immediately raised a new concern in Mexican policymaking circles: while the agreement would secure access to the country's exports in the US and Canadian markets, it created strong incentives for exporting only to them. At that time the expectation was that the share of Mexican exports concentrated in the US market would climb from 70% more than 80%. Government officials estimated that negotiating FTAs elsewhere would help provide investors with a more geographically-neutral export 27 Except petroleum, whose control the Mexican Constitution retains for the State.
incentive, reduce the vulnerability associated with a high export concentration in just one market, and perhaps integrate productive chains between more countries. Once free trade had been adopted as the new economic paradigm, there was no reason to stop in just one country or region.
What other countries were ideal partners? From an economic viewpoint, one would expect those with the largest share of bilateral trade and potential investment flows, whose economic structure allowed for complementarities, and with a similar level of development. For Mexico in the early 1990s, the best candidates according this line of reasoning were the European Community (not yet a full-fledged Union), Japan, and to a lesser degree Latin America. Together they represented more than 90% of Mexican trade.
But the choice was neither clear-cut nor preordained. Even though Western Europe was Mexico's second largest trade and investment partner, its level of development was much higher than Mexico's, and it was on the other side of the Atlantic. Europe, moreover, was immersed in its own integration dynamic, with an eye on investment opportunities in the recently opened Eastern Block.
Japan was a reliable and important trade and investment partner as well, but it was far in the Pacific and preferred multilateral to bilateral trade negotiations.
For Japan an FTA was from the outset a non-starter. Brazil, Mexico's main trade partner in Latin America shared a comparable level of development, but its economic structure did not allow for significant economic complementarities.
And it was focused on consolidating Mercosur, where it had a clear leadership.
An FTA with Mexico was not even an afterthought. Even then, the volume of trade involved outside Europe and Japan was relatively minor to create major worries among domestic producers. The biggest hurdleaccepting to negotiate with the US-had already been overcome. Ambivalence was affordable for a while: Japanese firms exporting to
Mexico components for the in-bond industry, which in turn exported to the US, obtained special tariff treatment by the Mexican government -a NAFTA parity of sorts. As the full provisions of NAFTA were implemented, which in the end were discriminatory to countries without an FTA, the real costs of this ad-hoc accommodation became evident. Japanese firms had to deal with cumbersome administrative procedures and red-tape in both Mexico and the United States which their competitors could avoid. Pressure from Japanese investors and Mexican businessmen increased for an FTA that provided full NAfta parity.
Private sector pressure, however, was insufficient. It was until Japan, realizing that multilateral trade talks were going to proceed slowly, opted to negotiate an FTA with Singapore, that the door for concluding a negotiation with Mexico finally opened. After a long and tortuous process the two countries reached an agreement in 2004. the choice of the US as the first partner responded to economic considerations more than anything else, as did the choice to negotiate with the European Union before, say, the Middle East, or with Japan rather than Malaysia.
By way of summary
3. International factors were necessary, but not sufficient, for the development of a strategy of competitive regionalism. Without Mexico's unilateral trade liberalization and accession to the GATT, and without the constant imposition of barriers to trade between Mexico and the US, it would have been hard for the government to justify NAFTA. Domestic support, which had to be consolidated, was crucial for the negotiations.
4. Emulation did influence the Mexican government's decisions, but it is difficult to disentangle it from the calculus of economic competition.
